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Determining whether an individual is an employee or an independ-
ent contractor is of primary importance when the individual is injured
while performing assigned or contracted work. Under Nebraska law,
an employee who is injured in the course of her employment is entitled
to compensation from the employer.1 Once an injury occurs in the
course of work, the injured individual has an incentive to argue that
she is an employee. If her argument is accepted, she will be entitled to
receive compensation from her employer or, more likely, the em-
ployer's insurance provider. The employer or employer's insurance
provider has an opposite incentive: they want the individual classified
as an independent contractor so they may avoid liability for the injury.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Larson v. Hometown Communica-
tions, Inc.2 addressed these two competing interests. In Larson, the
court was faced with determining whether a young girl, Jennifer Lar-
son, injured while delivering newspapers for the Fremont Tribune,
was an independent contractor or an employee. At stake was whether
the paper and its insurance provider would have to provide insurance
coverage for Larson's injuries, which left her in a persistent vegetative
state. The Tribune maintained she was an independent contractor
and argued against awarding benefits under Nebraska's Workers'
Compensation Act. Larson, through her father as next friend, urged
the court to classify her as an employee.
In determining Larson's status as an employee or independent con-
tractor, the court relied upon the ten-factor analysis first established
in Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Department of Labor.3 Along with an-
alyzing the facts under this ten-factor analysis, the Larson court had
to rule on an ambiguity between two Nebraska statutes: section 48-
179 and section 48-185. Also important to the holding was whether a
substitute employee is entitled to benefits under Nebraska's Workers'
Compensation Act.
The Larson court clarified the statutory ambiguity in the workers'
compensation law, held that substitute employees can receive work-
ers' compensation benefits, and held that Jennifer Larson was an em-
ployee under the ten-factor analysis. Although this ruling creates no
new law, Larson is important because it clarifies issues of Nebraska
workers' compensation law.
The court in Larson clearly establishes the ten-factor analysis as
controlling in determinations of employee or independent contractor
status. Larson stands apart from other holdings because it empha-
sizes how each factor of the test should be applied to the facts. Larson
1. NFB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1993).
2. 248 Neb. 942, 540 N.W.2d 339 (1995).
3. 214 Neb. 68, 71-72, 333 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (1983).
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also develops many individual factors of the test more fully than previ-
ous holdings concerned with employee/independent contractor
determinations.
The court resolved the latent ambiguity in section 48-179 and sec-
tion 48-185 by clarifying the appellate process in workers' compensa-
tion cases. Equally important was the holding that substitute
employees were eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits.
The court correctly held that substitute workers who are authorized
by employers have the same rights as employees injured during the
course of work.
Larson is the clearest application of issues concerning employee/
independent contractor analysis to date. Part II sets out the facts of
this case. Part III describes the background of the statutory analysis,
the development of the ten-factor test, and the background of the sub-
stitute employee doctrine. Part IV is an analysis of the court's reason-
ing concerning the statutory analysis, the ten-factor test, and the
substitute employee doctrine. Part V concludes by summarizing the
holding in Larson and by noting that the holding is a logical extension
of past precedent.
II. FACTS
Jennifer Larson started delivering newspapers for the Fremont
Tribune through her friendship with Valerie Brauner, who had an es-
tablished newspaper route with the Tribune.4 When Jennifer was
twelve-years-old, she was struck by an automobile while she was de-
livering newspapers for the Tribune,5 a publication of Hometown
Communications, Inc. and Hometown Operations, Inc.6 Jennifer sus-
tained severe and permanent injuries and as a result was left in a
persistent vegetative state.
7
A. Brauner's Newspaper Carrier Agreement with the
Tribunes
During July 1989, Valerie Brauner entered into an "Independent
Carrier Agreement" with the Tribune. The Tribune agreed to furnish
a delivery schedule and Brauner, as carrier, agreed to deliver all
newspapers according to the schedule. Under the agreement, the
Tribune was to furnish Brauner with the required quantity of newspa-
4. Larson v. Hometown Communications Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 949, 540 N.W.2d 339,
345 (1995).
5. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 3 Neb. Ct. App. 367,368,526 N.W.2d
691, 694 (1995).
6. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 943, 540 N.W.2d 339,
343 (1995).
7. Id. at 949, 540 N.W.2d at 346.
8. Id. at 945-49, 540 N.W.2d at 343-45.
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pers. Brauner agreed to pay for the papers, but she was free to engage
in other business activities as long as the papers were delivered on
time. Additionally, the agreement provided for the dissolution of the
relationship by either party upon twenty-four days notice. The Trib-
une supplied Brauner with a "Carrier Handbook," a "Vacation Hand-
book for Your Substitute," collection receipt cards, and a collection
calendar.
The "Carrier Handbook" is a multiple page book detailing every
aspect of the delivery process. The handbook states that the carrier is
not an employee of the Tribune, but is an "Independent Contract
Merchant." The handbook instructs the carrier on when the papers
are to be delivered and where the papers are to be placed for the cus-
tomer. The carrier is given detailed instructions on how to deal with
situations when a customer stops a subscription or papers pile up on a
porch. The carrier is also instructed to find and train substitutes if
she goes on vacation. The collection calendar indicates when collec-
tions should occur. The collection cards are provided so the carrier
can keep track of payments by subscribers and so the carrier can know
how she is supposed to interact with each customer.
The Tribune provides all supplies, which are charged to the carrier.
These supplies include rubber bands, plastic bags, carrier bags, collec-
tion cards, introduction pads, and collection pads. Every carrier is re-
quired to maintain a savings account balance to cover these bills. The
Tribune also provides sales tips and promotional fliers to encourage
the carrier to solicit new business and awards bonuses for each new
customer the carrier obtains.
The "Vacation Handbook for Your Substitute" instructs the substi-
tute carrier on the basics of newspaper delivery. The regular carrier is
instructed on a number of steps to follow before she turns over her
route to a substitute carrier. The regular carrier is required to review
every aspect of the handbook with the substitute. In addition, the car-
rier is required to notify the Tribune when a substitute is used.
Valerie Brauner, Jennifer Larson's friend, was instructed on this
material before beginning work for the Tribune. Nevertheless,
Brauner had trouble completing her route and became tired of having
sole responsibility for it. Splitting her route with Jennifer Larson be-
came the solution to Valerie Brauner's delivery problems.
B. Larson's Relationship with the Tribune9
Brauner and Larson discussed dividing the delivery schedule. The
girls' mothers then worked out a schedule to split the route. Brauner
retained the collection duty, but the profits of the route were divided
equally between the two girls. In August 1990, the Tribune was noti-
9. Id. at 949, 540 N.W.2d at 345-46.
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fled by letter of the arrangement, although Larson never signed a car-
rier agreement. The Tribune never objected to the arrangement, and
the district manager responsible for the girls' route once asked the
girls whether their arrangement was satisfactory. The arrangement
lasted fewer than six months because of the accident involving Larson.
On February 22, 1991, Larson was struck by an automobile while
delivering newspapers. She sustained traumatic brain injuries and
was left in a persistent vegetative state. Demand was made upon the
Tribune for workers' compensation insurance coverage. The Tribune
denied coverage on the grounds that Larson was an independent con-
tractor and not entitled to benefits. Because coverage was denied,
David Larson, Jennifer's father, filed suit to force the Tribune and its
insurer to cover the injuries.
C. Litigation of Larson's ClaimO
David Larson, as Jennifer's father and next friend, fied suit with
the Workers' Compensation Court for benefits. The trial before a sin-
gle judge was bifurcated to determine first if Larson was an employee
of the Tribune, and if she was, then to determine her average weekly
wage. The judge ruled that Larson was an employee of the Tribune
and entered a final award for benefits on June 28, 1993. The Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Review Panel reversed the award,
finding as a matter of law that the trial judge erred by ruling Jennifer
was an employee of the paper. David Larson appealed the ruling. The
court of appeals reversed the review panel and reinstated the trial
judge's decision. The Tribune and its insurer appealed to the supreme
court, which affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that Larson was cov-
ered under Nebraska's Workers' Compensation Act and entitled to
benefits under the Act.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Interpretation of the Scope of Review
Section 48-101 of the Nebraska statutes provides that when an em-
ployee sustains a personal injury in an accident in the course of his
employment, the employee shall receive compensation from his em-
ployer.11 Simply put, if an employee is injured while working, the em-
ployer is obligated to provide compensation under Nebraska's workers'
compensation laws. Once an injury occurs, the interested parties have
a right to settle all matters of compensation between themselves pro-
vided they have the consent of the insurance carrier.1 2
10. Id. at 949-50, 540 N.W.2d at 346.
11. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1993).
12. Id. § 48-136.
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Frequently, however, the employee's claim is disputed. The insur-
ance carrier or employer may refuse to settle because they feel no ben-
efits are warranted. Nebraska's workers' compensation statutes
establish the law used to resolve disputed claims.13 The first step is to
submit the disputed claim to a trial court. Nebraska law gives exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of workers' compensation claims to the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Court,' 4 which serves as the trial
court and fact-finder for deciding disputed claims between employers
and individuals. All disputed claims must first be submitted to this
court for a finding, award, order, or judgment.1
5
Once a finding, award, order, or judgment is entered, either party
can file an application for review of the decision before the compensa-
tion court's review panel.16 New evidence cannot be entered at the
review hearing, and the review panel may, but is not required to,
write an opinion.17 According to section 48-179, the review panel
"may reverse or modify the findings, order, award, or judgment of the
original hearing only on the grounds that the judge was clearly wrong
on the evidence or the decision was contrary to law."' 8 The review
panel may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand the judgment on the
original hearing.' 9
Under section 48-185, an appeal from the judgment of the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Court next proceeds to the Nebraska
Court of Appeals and then to the Nebraska Supreme Court.20 The
scope of review for these two courts is set forth in section 48-185,
which provides the following:
A judgment, order, or award of the compensation court may be modified, re-
versed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court
acted without or in excess of its powers, (2) the judgment, order, or award was
procured by fraud, (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record
to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award, or (4) the findings of
fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award.
2 1
Once a compensation court decision proceeds to the appeals or
supreme court, any judgment must fall within these statutory
guidelines.
Interpreting section 48-179 and section 48-185 has led to some con-
fusion in the courts. Section 48-185 clearly applies to the appellate
process in the appeals court and supreme court. How this statute op-
13. Id. § 48 et seq.
14. Id. § 48-161.
15. Id.








erates in relation to section 48-179, however, is unclear. The issue is
whether the workers' compensation trial court or the review panel
should be given the full force and effect of a jury verdict. Section 48-
185 states that "the judgment made by the compensation court after
review shall have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil
case."2 2 Ambiguity results because the statute fails to state specifi-
cally which ruling, that of the trial court or that of the review panel, is
to be given the full force and effect of a jury verdict.
While the Nebraska Supreme Court had not addressed this statu-
tory ambiguity before Larson, the Nebraska Court of Appeals had
ruled on this issue. The court in Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co.2 3
held that the compensation court's review panel could not "go beyond
its statutory mandate for review."2 4 Section 48-179 clearly mandates
that the review panel can modify or reverse the trial court's decision
only if the judge was clearly wrong on the evidence or the decision was
contrary to law.2 5 The Pearson court also held that "the single judge
of the compensation court is the fact-finding trial court and the review
panel is performing the first level of appellate review."26 The court
reasoned that, unlike the trial judge, the review panel does not see or
hear witnesses and is not in the position of a fact-finder. It follows
then, that the deference given to a fact-finder could be given only to
the trial court and not to the review panel.27 To reach its conclusion,
the appeals court went through a complete analysis of legislative in-
tent28 and delivered a well-reasoned opinion.
The court of appeals in Larson accepted the reasoning of the Pear-
son court and quoted extensively from the Pearson opinion to support
its position.2 9 The defendants in Larson, however, continued to argue
that the findings of the review panel should have the force and effect
of a jury verdict. Thus, the issue of the ambiguity between section 48-
22. Id.
23. 2 Neb. Ct. App. 703, 513 N.W.2d 361 (1994). The decision in Pearson did not
involve issues in determining whether an individual was an independent contrac-
tor or an employee. A trial judge of the workers' compensation court had dis-
missed a claim for benefits by an employee of Lincoln Telephone Company who
had lost his hearing. The claim was dismissed because the medical evidence did
not specify the amount of hearing loss, if any, the plaintiff had sustained. The
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Review Panel reviewed the evidence, vacated
the trial judge's order, and remanded the matter. Lincoln Telephone appealed,
and the court of appeals held that the review panel exceeded its statutory man-
date for review. Id. at 713, 513 N.W.2d at 369.
24. Id. at 712, 513 N.W.2d at 367.
25. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 48-179 (Reissue 1993).
26. Pearson v. Lincoln Tel. Co., 2 Neb. Ct. App. 703, 712, 513 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1994).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 710-11, 513 N.W.2d at 366.




179 and section 48-185 pertaining to the scope of review was ad-
dressed directly by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Larson.
B. Employeelndependent Contractor Analysis
In Bohy v. Pfister Hybrid Co., the Nebraska Supreme Court first
held that no single test determined whether a worker was an em-
ployee or independent contractor. Instead, all of the facts in each case
must be analyzed to make the determination.3 0 Since Bohy, the
supreme court has developed and faithfully applied a consistent ana-
lytical approach for determining employee or independent contractor
status. 31
This approach first was used in Erspamer Advertising Co. v. De-
partment of Labor,32 which considered ten factors when analyzing the
facts in the case. These factors were adopted directly from section 220
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.33 In Hemmerling v. Happy
Cab Co., a recent case determining the employment status of a cab
driver, the supreme court presented the following factors to consider:
(1) the extent of the control which, by the agreement, the employer may exer-
cise over the details of the work, (2) whether the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business, (3) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision, (4) the skill required in the
particular occupation, (5) whether employer or the one employed supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work,
(6) the length of time for which the one employed is engaged, (7) the method of
payment, whether by the time or by the job, (8) whether the work is part of the
regular business of the employer, (9) whether the parties believe they are cre-
30. Bohy v. Pfister Hybrid Co., 179 Neb. 337, 340, 138 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965). In Bohy,
the supreme court reviewed a contract agreement between Bohy and Pfister Hy-
brid Company and other aspects of Bohy's work to determine if he was an em-
ployee or independent contractor of the company. Bohy had entered into a
contract to be a dealer for the company's seed corn. He was killed in a grade
crossing accident and subsequently his wife applied for workers' compensation
benefits. After reviewing all aspects of Bohy's work, the court held he was an
independent contractor. Id. at 341, 138 N.W.2d at 27.
31. All cases researched for this Note concerning the determination of employee/in-
dependent contractor analysis contained this language from Bohy v. Pfister Hy-
brid Co., 179 Neb. 337, 138 N.W.2d 23 (1965), in some form. Bohy appears to be
the original source of this language, but may not always be cited in applicable
cases.
32. 214 Neb. 68, 71-72, 333 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (1983). In Erspamer, the court ex-
panded the test for analyzing whether an individual is an independent contractor
or employee. Section 48-604(5) does provide a test for determining the employ-
ment status of an individual (in Erspamer, this test is referred to as the "ABC
test"). See NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-604(5) (Reissue 1993). The court in Erspamer
broadened the statutory test by reading into its definition the ten-factor em-
ployee/independent contractor test contained in the Restatement. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). The statutory test is virtually ignored in
favor of the ten-factor test introduced by the supreme court in Erspamer.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
1006 [Vol. 76:999
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
ating an agency relationship, and (10) whether the employer is or is not in
business.
3 4
When analyzing these factors, the court must view the facts of each
case in light of prior holdings. As noted above, no single factor is dis-
positive. Some factors, however, obviously will be weighed more heav-
ily than others.
The first and arguably the most important factor is the control the
employer exercises in overseeing the work of the employee. In Eden v.
Spaulding, the supreme court recognized that the right of control is
the chief factor in making the determination of employee or independ-
ent contractor status.3 5 The court tempered this language by noting
that an employer is allowed to exercise the control necessary to assure
compliance with the contract terms.3 6 This factor exists on a contin-
uum. The more control exerted over the work by the employer, the
more likely the court will view the worker as an employee. Exercising
little or no control over the work will result in viewing the worker as
an independent contractor.
The second factor is whether the individual is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business. This factor is concerned primarily with
whether the worker offers similar services to other businesses. In
Eden, the court held that an individual with separate incomes from
34. Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 929, 530 N.W.2d 916, 922
(1995)(citing Delicious Foods Co. v. Millard Warehouse, 244 Neb. 449, 456, 507
N.W. 631, 636 (1993)(citing Erspamer Adver. Co. v. Department of Labor, 214
Neb. 68, 71-72, 333 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (1983))).
35. Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 804, 359 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984). See also Mar-
icle v. Spiegel, 213 Neb. 223,233,329 N.W.2d 80,87 (1983). The Eden court went
through the ten-factor analysis to determine whether a delivery driver was an
employee or independent contractor. Ronald Eden was struck by a truck driven
by Dennis Spaulding, who was employed by Ernest Fundum. The accident oc-
curred while Spaulding was in Omaha to pick up newspapers under a distribu-
tion agreement with the Omaha World Herald. At trial, the jury awarded Eden a
$3 million judgment against Spaulding, Fundum, and the World Herald. The
World Herald appealed the verdict. The court applied the ten-factor analysis,
and found that Fundum was an independent contractor of the World Herald. The
case against the World Herald was reversed and remanded for dismissal. See
Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 807, 359 N.W.2d 758, 764 (1984).
36. Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 804, 359 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984); Stephens v.
Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 20, 286 N.W.2d 420, 425 (1979). The Ste-
phens court evaluated the terms of a contract between Stephens and Celeryvale
Transport to determine whether Stephens was an employee or independent con-
tractor of the trucking firm. This case was decided before the court had estab-
lished the ten-factor analysis test. Important to the present analysis is that the
court looked at both the contract terms and outside evidence to make its decision.
Neither the contract language nor other evidence was used exclusively to deter-
mine that the plaintiff in Stephens was an independent contractor. The court




separate business contracts was engaged in a distinct business.3 7 If a
worker offers similar services to more than one business, the court will
tend to view the worker as an independent contractor.
Factors three, four, and five all involve the interaction between the
employer and the work. The more an employer is involved with the
actual work, the more likely the worker will be considered an em-
ployee. Factor three is concerned with whether, in the locality, the
work is done under direct supervision or by a specialist without super-
vision. To determine independent contractor status, the employer
must exert very little direct supervision. Fixed delivery routes, regu-
lations, or restrictions placed upon the worker will be indicative of em-
ployee status.3 8
The next factor is the skill required by the individual in performing
the work. If the work can be done by employees rather than specially
skilled workmen, the determination likely will be that the worker is
not an independent contractor.3 9 Another important consideration,
the fifth factor, is whether the worker supplies her own instrumentali-
ties, tools, and place of work. A highly skilled worker generally will
have her own tools, which tends toward finding independent contrac-
tor status.40
The sixth factor is the length of time for which the worker is em-
ployed. If a worker can be terminated without penalty, the worker
usually is considered an employee. 4 1 Individuals who are subject to
"at will" termination by the employer are characterized as being in an
employee relationship. Generally, an independent contractor can be
discharged only under the terms provided in the contract with the
employer.
The method of payment by the employer is the next factor. In Ste-
phens v. Celeryvale Transport, Inc., the court held that employees nor-
mally are compensated while they work, but an independent
contractor's compensation usually depends upon the profit made from
37. Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 805, 359 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Employers Ins. ofWausau v. Greater Omaha Transp. Co., 208 Neb. 276, 279,303
N.W.2d 282, 284 (1981). In Wausau, the court held that a cab driver was an
employee, not an independent contractor of a cab company. The court's analysis
of relevant factors was ill-developed in this case, although the outcome supports
the notion that driving a cab does not require specially skilled independent work-
men. The company gave each driver a comprehensive forty-page instruction
manual covering every aspect of the driver's job. Id. at 278, 303 N.W.2d at 283.
40. Voycheske v. Osborn, 196 Neb. 510, 512-13, 244 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1976). See Rig-
gins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 895, 11 N.W.2d 810, 811-12
(1943)(listing behavior typical of an independent contractor).
41. Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 805, 359 N.W.2d 758, 763 (1984); Schneider v.
Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 687, 57 N.W.2d 527, 530 (1953).
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a contract.4 2 It should be noted, however, that "payment of wages on a
piece or quantity basis is not inconsistent with the status of an em-
ployee."43 If a worker is compensated on a continuous basis, then the
court tends to regard that worker as an employee.
Whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the em-
ployer is the eighth factor. If the individual is performing work essen-
tial to the operation of the business, the individual likely is an
employee.44
The ninth factor considers whether the parties believe they are cre-
ating an agency relationship. This factor is one of the most difficult to
determine because the worker invariably will argue that she felt she
held the status of an employee. The facts underlying the relationship
itself are used to determine whether an agency relationship exists ir-
respective of the words or terminology used by the parties to charac-
terize their relationship. 4 5 The facts are of primary importance when
a contract exists between the worker and employer. This contract
could delineate either an employer-employee or employer-independent
contractor relationship.
In Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., the court held that if the parties
formed a contract, it would be considered of prime importance, 4 6 but
warned that the contract could not be used to conceal the true rela-
tionship between the parties.4 7 In the same opinion, the court also
held that when a written contract described the relationship as that of
an independent contractor, and nothing in the performance was incon-
sistent with the contract, then the individual would be held to be an
independent contractor as a matter of law.43 Contracts establishing
42. Stephens v. Celeryvale Transport, Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 22, 286 N.W.2d 420, 426
(1979).
43. Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 896, 11 N.W.2d 810, 812
(1943)(finding that a worker who was paid to paint trailers at a rate of $2.50 per
trailer was not inconsistent with the status of an employee).
44. The court generally breezes past this factor when applying the ten-factor analy-
sis. See Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 958, 540
N.W.2d 339, 350 (1995); Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 3 Neb. Ct.
App. 367, 381, 526 N.W.2d 691, 701 (1995).
45. Delicious Foods Co. v. Millard Warehouse, Inc., 244 Neb. 449, 456, 507 N.W.2d
631, 637 (1993); Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 235 Neb. 816, 827, 458 N.W.2d
443, 451 (1990).
46. Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 927, 530 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1995).
See also Stephens v. Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 19, 286 N.W.2d 420,
424 (1979).
47. Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 927, 530 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1995).
See also Stephens v. Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 19, 286 N.W.2d 420,
424 (1979).
48. Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 927, 530 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1995).
See also Knowlton v. Airport Transp. Co., 235 Neb. 96, 99, 454 N.W.2d 278, 280
(1990); Spulak v. Estep, 216 Neb. 523,526, 344 N.W.2d 475,477 (1984); Stephens
v. Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 12, 286 N.W.2d 420, 421 (1979).
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an independent contractor relationship are not determinative on their
face. The court always will look beyond the contract to the facts to
determine the true nature of the relationship irrespective of the con-
tract language.
The tenth and final factor considers whether or not the employer is
in the business. Simply put, is the work under contract part of the
employer's business? This factor is difficult to distinguish from factor
eight, but the court continues to include it in the analysis. Most nota-
bly, the court has considered this factor to determine whether the em-
ployer withholds taxes from payments to the worker. The deduction of
social security taxes and withholding of income tax indicates an em-
ployee relationship, while failure to do so indicates that an independ-
ent contractor relationship exists.4 9
When applying this ten-factor test, no single factor is dispositive on
the issue of whether the worker is an employee or independent con-
tractor. The factors also are not quantitative. A majority of factors
favoring either employee or independent contractor status still may
not persuade a court of the respective status. Before ruling, the court
will consider the factors in light of all the facts.
C. Substitute Workers as Employees
There is little direct Nebraska law on the issue of whether a substi-
tute employee is entitled to compensation under the Nebraska Work-
ers' Compensation Act. When employers require employees to find
substitutes when the employees are unable to perform their duties,
the question becomes whether an injured substitute employee can re-
ceive benefits under the Act. Under section 48-115(2), an individual
with an implied or express contract to work for an employer who is
engaged in any business shall have the same power as employees
under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.50 If the court finds
an implied contract between the employer and the substitute, the sub-
stitute is entitled to benefits under section 48-115. The implied con-
tract arises when the employer accepts or acquiesces in the
substitution of one worker for another. A person working as a substi-
tute may be an employee under a workers' compensation act when the
49. See Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 806-07, 359 N.W.2d 758, 763 (1984). This
case considers the withholding of taxes without applying the ten-factor test. The
Larson court included this criterion under the tenth factor of the test. Larson v.
Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 959, 540 N.W.2d 339, 351,
(1995). While it seems an imperfect fit to consider the withholding of taxes as the
tenth factor, the court appears intent on including it in determining employee or
independent contractor status. Analyzing whether or not taxes are withheld by
employers appears repeatedly in recent cases. See, e.g., Hemrnerling v. Happy
Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 930, 530 N.W.2d 916, 923 (1995); Anthony v. Pre-Fab
Transit Co., 239 Neb. 404, 409, 476 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1991).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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employer knows of or encourages substitutes to fill in for employees. 5 1
By encouraging the substitution, the employer in effect creates an im-
plied contract with the substitute. Once an implied contract is shown,
the substitute is entitled to benefits.
The court of appeals in Larson cited two cases that support the
specific assertion that substitutes recognized by employers have the
same status as employees under a workers' compensation act.52 In
Bobik v. Industrial Commission,53 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
"it is a well-settled rule of law that if a master expressly or impliedly
assents to an arrangement whereby a person is procured by an em-
ployee to act as his substitute . . . such substitute . . . occupies the
position of an employee of the master."54 The second case dealt di-
rectly with the question of substitute newspaper carriers. Veit v. Cou-
rier Post Newspaper55 involved a mother who was injured while
delivering newspapers as a substitute for her son. The mother ini-
tially was denied compensation by the compensation court. It was un-
disputed that the newspaper as a standard practice encouraged
newspaper carriers to engage substitutes when they were unable to
make deliveries.5 6 On the question of the relationship between the
substitute and the employer, the New Jersey appellate court held that
there was an implied contract between the substitute, the mother, and
the newspaper because the paper routinely allowed carriers to engage
substitutes and therefore had implied notice of this specific
substitution.57
The key consideration for a substitute employee to be eligible for
benefits under a workers' compensation act is to find at minimum an
implied contract with the employer. An implied contract most likely
will arise from an employer policy allowing substitutes as found in
Veit or by an assent to a particular substitution as held in Bobik. The
issue before the court in Larson was Larson's relationship to the
Fremont Tribune because she had no express contract with the paper.
Because of her relationship with her friend Brauner, who did have a
contract, Larson's relationship with the Tribune was more akin to that
of a substitute carrier.
51. 99 C.J.S Workmen's Compensation § 74 (1958).
52. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 3 Neb. Ct. App. 367, 383-84, 526
N.W.2d 691, 702 (1995).
53. 64 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ohio 1946).
54. Id. at 832.
55. 382 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).





In Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc.,5 8 the Nebraska
Supreme Court correctly applied existing workers' compensation law
to the facts. In rejecting the assumption that newspaper carriers are
independent contractors as a matter of law due to contract language,
the court remained consistent in its approach of identifying and ana-
lyzing whether an individual is an independent contractor or an
employee.
The analysis of a worker's status as either an employee or in-
dependent contractor rests on the ten-factor analysis first established
in Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Department of Labor.59 Before the test
could be applied, however, the Larson court needed to clarify its scope
of review with regard to section 48-1796o and section 48-185.61 The
court held that the decision of the workers' compensation court trial
judge was entitled to the force and effect of a jury verdict while the
three judge review panel was not. The supreme court further held
that the worker's compensation review panel is the first level of appeal
and is controlled by section 48-179, while further appeals to the court
of appeals and the supreme court are controlled by section 48-185.62
The supreme court, in regard to the application of section 48-179 and
section 48-185, applied a consistent and logical approach in accord
with past precedents. With the statutory issue clarified, the ten-factor
employee/independent contractor analysis was applied.
Finally, the court addressed the question of whether Larson was a
substitute employee and therefore not under a contract for hire with
the paper. Once again, in a very straightforward and concise manner,
the supreme court applied Nebraska law and found that under the
facts, a substitute carrier was an employee of the paper.63
Larson is not a revolutionary precedent in Nebraska worker's com-
pensation law. The holding clarifies areas of the law, however, and
illustrates a logical and sound approach in the application of the ten-
factor analysis.
A. Clarifying the Ambiguity
The first issue the Larson court addressed was the scope of review
by courts hearing appeals from a decision by the trial judge of the
workers' compensation court, which required an analysis of section 48-
58. 248 Neb. 942, 540 N.W.2d 339 (1995).
59. 214 Neb. 68, 71-72, 333 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (1983).
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-179 (Reissue 1993).
61. Id. § 48-185.
62. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 952, 540 N.W.2d 339,
347 (1995).
63. Id. at 964, 540 N.W.2d at 353.
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179 and section 48-185. These two statutes control the appellate pro-
cess in workers' compensation cases. The defendants challenged that
the decision of the review panel had the force and effect of a jury ver-
dict. The court disagreed with the defendant's argument and instead
opted to follow the reasoning of the court of appeals on this matter.
64
The court of appeals in Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co. held that
the review panel of the workers' compensation court was bound to the
same standard of review of the trial court's decision as the supreme
court and the court of appeals. 65 The review panel thus becomes the
first level of appeal in workers' compensation cases, and the review
panel should not substitute its view of the facts for the trial court's.
6 6
If sufficient evidence supports the award, the review panel should af-
firm the decision, order, or award of the trial court.
The review panel is limited by section 48-179 in its review of cases.
No new evidence may be introduced at such review hearing. The review
panel may write an opinion, but need not do so, and may make its decision by
a brief summary order. The compensation court may reverse or modify the
findings, order, award, or judgment of the original hearings only on the
grounds that the judge was clearly wrong on the evidence or the decision was
contrary to law.6 7
The review panel quite clearly is not empowered to substitute its view
of the facts for the view taken by the trial court. If the evidence in the
record supports the trial court's decision, the review panel should af-
firm the decision, award, or order of the court.68 Once the decision is
appealed, section 48-185 controls the scope of review.
The judgment made by the compensation court after review shall have the
same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case. A judgment, order, or
award of the compensation court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only
upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of
its powers, (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud, (3) there
is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the
order, judgment, or award, or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation
court do not support the order or award.
6 9
The supreme court in Larson adopted the court of appeals' stance
on the scope of review:7 0 section 48-179 controls the review procedure
of workers' compensation decisions and section 48-185 controls further
appellate review. The appellate court therefore reviews the findings of
the trial court to determine if sufficient evidence supported the award
64. Id. at 952, 540 N.W.2d at 347.
65. 2 Neb. Ct. App. 703, 712, 513 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1994).
66. Id.
67. NEB. Ruv. STAT. § 48-179 (Reissue 1993).
68. Pearson v. Lincoln Tel. Co., 2 Neb. Ct. App. 703, 712, 513 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1994).
69. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1993).




to Larson.71 The evidence from the trial must support the facts before
the appellate court will determine whether the facts support any
award.
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in affirming
that the workers' compensation review panel's decisions did not de-
serve the force and effect of a jury verdict. After all, it is at the trial
level in the workers' compensation court that facts are litigated. The
review panel acts as the first level of appeal in these cases. Thus, the
panel is limited by statute to the scope of its review. 72 The supreme
court made the only decision possible under Nebraska's statutory
scheme. The workers' compensation review panel acts as the first
level of appeal and is not allowed to make determinations of fact.
That power rests solely and correctly with the judge at the trial level.
The confusion as to which court should make determinations of
fact originates in the sentence in section 48-185 that states that "[t]he
judgment made by the compensation court after review shall have the
same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case."73 This section is
vague in the sense that it does not state specifically whether the trial
court or the review panel is the court with the force and effect of a jury
verdict. The drafters of the statute should have clarified this by re-
placing "compensation court" with language such as "compensation
trial court." Because of the inherent vagueness of this sentence, the
court of appeals and the supreme court were left to interpret the lan-
guage of the statute. The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the
appeals court in Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co.7 4 and in Larson v.
Hometown Communications, Inc.75 With the ambiguity clarified, the
court could address its scope of review for the present case.
Under subsections (3) and (4) of section 48-185, the Larson court
first was required to review the evidence to determine if it was suffi-
cient to warrant the issue of benefits to Larson.76 Next, it had to de-
termine if the findings of fact supported the award. It is important to
note, as the court did, that the determination of a individual's status
as an employee or independent contractor normally is a question of
fact, but it also can be a question of law if the employer-employee rela-
tionship is clear.7 7
Larson narrows the scope of review for the workers' compensation
review panel. Under Larson, the review panel is limited in its review
71. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 952, 540 N.W.2d 339,
347 (1995).
72. Id.
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1993).
74. 2 Neb. Ct. App. 703, 513 N.W.2d 361 (1994).





and is controlled by section 48-179. Later appeals are controlled by
section 48-185.
B. Ten-Factor Analysis Applied to Larson
In determining whether a newspaper carrier was an employee or
independent contractor, the Nebraska Supreme Court used the ten-
factor analysis it first established in Erspamer Advertising Co. v. De-
partment of Labor.78 No single factor is determinative of employee or
independent contractor status.7 9 The ten factors the court considered
in analyzing the carrier's relationship to the Fremont Tribune
originated from Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co.80 The Larson court
applied a step-by-step analysis of each factor to determine if newspa-
per carriers for the Fremont Tribune were independent contractors or
employees. This was significant because the court provided a
roadmap for assessing the status of independent contractor or em-
ployee status, which had been lacking in past rulings.
The first factor of control historically has been the most important
in determining employment status. The supreme court in Eden v.
Spaulding held that the right of control generally is the chief criterion
in determining the outcome of such cases.8 1 An employer does not
have to give up total control to assure the status of an independent
contractor. Employers are allowed to retain the control necessary to
assure performance of the contract.8 2
The real question is the degree of control. The Larson court looked
at the facts to determine if the Tribune maintained direct control over
its carriers. Because the newspaper maintained control over the
routes, delivery times, and the cost of the paper, the court held that
sufficient evidence supported the trial judge's finding on control. The
trial court had held that the control exercised by the Tribune was
more than what was necessary to assure delivery of its newspapers.
8 3
To prevail on this factor, the defendants needed to show that the
carriers were in fact the "Independent Contract Merchants" the car-
rier handbook portrayed them to be. The Tribune maintained that it
retained only the control necessary to assure compliance with the con-
tract.8 4 The handbook, however, contained numerous instructions on
78. 214 Neb. 68, 71-72, 333 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (1983).
79. Boby v. Pfister Hybrid Co., 179 Neb. 337, 340, 138 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965).
80. 247 Neb. 919, 530 N.W.2d 916 (1995). See also supra Part III (listing the ten
factors used in analysis).
81. 218 Neb. 799, 804, 359 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984). See also Maricle v. Spiegel, 213
Neb. 223, 233, 329 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1983).
82. Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 804, 359 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984); Stephens v.
Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 20, 286 N.W.2d 420, 425 (1979).





how the carriers were to conduct themselves, including guidelines re-
garding substitutes, bundling papers, collecting from customers, and
other facets of the delivery process. The Tribune exercised control in
almost every aspect important to the work. The relationship was in-
dependent in name only. Only the workers' compensation review
panel failed to recognize this.
The remaining nine factors appear to revolve around the issue of
control. It even could be argued that these factors are merely indicia
of control to which the court looks when considering the first factor.
The holding in Larson, however, does not support this point. If the
court was giving merely a cursory reading to the other nine factors, it
would not have considered each point separately. The holding in Lar-
son is proof that the court will consider each factor separately.
The second factor considers whether the carriers were engaged in a
distinct business or offered similar services to other businesses.
Neither of the girls held other jobs; they were a part of a system of
delivering newspapers. The court thus held that sufficient evidence
supported the finding that the girls were not performing a function in
which they were specialists, and therefore, were not engaged in a dis-
tinct business.8 5
Whether the work is done under direct supervision is the third fac-
tor. The Tribune maintained it did not exercise control over the carri-
ers, but the court held otherwise.8 6 A district manager was
responsible for more than seventy carriers. If one of the carriers
missed a delivery, it was the manager's duty to insure delivery. When
complaints were registered, the manager notified the carrier.
Although the supervisory relationship was neither formal nor day-to-
day, the control maintained by the manager was sufficient to show
work normally was supervised.8 7 For the carriers to be independent
under this test, they probably would have needed to field and handle
complaints themselves. Yet, the carrier handbook also indicated that
the employer maintained control under this factor. Almost every as-
pect of the delivery process was spelled out in the handbook, and man-
agers expected carriers to follow the handbook directives. Thus, the
handbook became the regulations for delivering newspapers.
85. Id. This contrasts factually with Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 805, 359
N.W.2d 758, 762 (1984). In Eden, the individual working for the company had
more than one source of income. The individual's distinct business was not exclu-
sively tied to the company. In Larson's case, however, the Fremont Tribune was
the exclusive source of income. See supra note 35.
86. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 955-56, 540 N.W.2d
339, 349 (1995).
87. Id. In Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 805, 359 N.W.2d 758, 763 (1984), the
court pointed out that the company had little or no supervision over the individ-
ual. See supra note 35.
1016 [Vol. 76:999
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
The skill required to perform the job is also a factor. In Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Greater Omaha Transportation Co., the court
held that the less skill required in a job, the greater the indication the
worker is an employee and not an independent contractor.8 8 A job in
which children carry newspapers hardly can be deemed highly skilled.
This is the position the court adopted.8 9
The next factor is whether the employer supplied the instrumen-
talities, tools, or place of work. In Larson, the Tribune provided all of
the necessary equipment for the delivery of its papers. This ranged
from the designated routes of the carriers to rubberbands and other
basic supplies. Normally, an independent contractor furnishes his
own supplies. The court held that the Tribune supplied the
instrumentalities. 90
The sixth factor was the length of time for which the worker was
engaged. Although the carrier agreement stated that the agreement
could be terminated upon twenty-four days notice by either party, in
practice, the Tribune terminated unsatisfactory carriers without no-
tice.9 1 The ability to terminate without penalty indicates an employee
relationship. The court held that the Tribune had this power, and
Larson's continuous employment also indicated an employee
relationship.
92
88. 208 Neb. 276, 279, 303 N.W.2d 282, 284 (1981).
89. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 956, 540 N.W.2d 339,
349 (1995). An interesting parallel can be made between Larson and Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Greater Omaha Transportation Co., 208 Neb. 276, 303
N.W.2d 282 (1981). In both cases, the employer furnished the worker with an
extensive instruction manual detailing how the work was to be performed, and in
each case, the court held that the worker was not a highly skilled individual. The
court in Larson did very little comparison with the holding in Wausau. Combin-
ing parts of the holdings in these two cases would appear to indicate a detailed
instruction manual is strong evidence of employee status.
90. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 957, 540 N.W.2d 339,
349-50 (1995). See Voycheske v. Osborn, 196 Neb. 510,244 N.W.2d 74 (1976). In
Voycheske, a part-time maintenance worker was held to be an independent con-
tractor. The factors the court used in reaching this conclusion included the fol-
lowing- Voycheske set his own hours, did specialized or complicated work for the
employer, the work was on a job-by-job basis, and Voycheske supplied his own
tools and supplies. Id. By contrast, the Fremont Tribune supplied all necessary
materials to Larson.
91. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 957, 540 N.W.2d 339,
350 (1995). See also Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 687, 57
N.W.2d 527, 530 (1952)(stating that one reason an electrician was held to be an
employee was that the employer could discharge the worker at will without liabil-
ity); Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 896, 11 N.W.2d 810,
812 (1943)(holding that a worker hired to paint trailers and who could be termi-
nated without liability favored employee status).




The method of payment is the seventh factor. The Tribune paid
the carriers a fixed rate for each paper delivered and set the price for
each paper. The carriers had no control over price. The court upheld
the trial judge's determination that this effectively created payment
based on a piece rate basis.93 The profits from the route did not rely so
much upon the contract, but on the price controls maintained by the
Tribune. Once again, this was strong evidence of an employee
relationship.
The eighth factor is whether the work was part of the regular busi-
ness of the employer. The court held that the delivery of newspapers
was an integral part of the business.94
The ninth factor requires more analysis because of the existence of
a contract between the carriers and the paper. This factor relies upon
whether the parties believe they are creating a master-servant rela-
tionship. The Larson court followed its ruling in Hemmerling v.
Happy Cab Co., which set forth that contract language cannot be used
to conceal the true nature of the relationship.95 The Tribune main-
tained that it considered its carriers independent contractors, while
the carriers thought of themselves as employees of the paper. The
Tribune introduced evidence that it was the newspaper industry's
standard to consider newspaper carriers as independent contractors.
The contract with Brauner stated she was an independent contractor
and not an employee. Brauner, at trial, contested that issue and
stated she thought of herself as an employee. She reasoned that the
Tribune expected her to deliver her route as directed, and if she did
not, she would be fired.96
With conflicting views, the court must determine which of the two
competing visions of the relationship is correct. Directly applying the
reasoning from Hemmerling,9 7 the court analyzed the contract in
Hemmerling and determined that the contract terms actually created
a employer-employee relationship in the case of a cab driver and the
dispatching company,9 8 even though historically, cab drivers were
considered independent contractors. The court reasoned that the con-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 958, 540 N.W.2d at 350.
95. Id. at 959, 540 N.W.2d at 351; Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 927,
530 N.W.2d 916, 922 (1995). See also Stephens v. Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205
Neb. 12, 19, 286 N.W.2d 420, 424 (1979); Bohy v. Pfister Hybrid Co., 179 Neb.
337, 138 N.W.2d 23 (1965)(stating that generally, contract language will be im-
portant, but not the exclusive source of evidence in determining whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor under the terms of a written
contract).
96. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 958-59, 540 N.W.2d
339, 350-51 (1995).
97. Id. at 959, 540 N.W.2d at 351.
98. Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 247 Neb. 919, 530 N.W.2d 916 (1995).
1018 [Vol. 76:999
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
tract and its language were of primary importance, but such a writing
could not be used to conceal the true nature of the relationship.99
By looking past the language of the carrier agreement between
Brauner and the Tribune, the court refused to accept contract lan-
guage as determinative of employment status. Cases determining
whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor rest
on the facts in each situation. Just because newspaper carriers sign
agreements labeling themselves as independent contractors, the exist-
ence of such an agreement should not bar a court from a full investiga-
tion of the facts.
While Brauner signed and agreed to abide by the Tribune's "In-
dependent Carrier Agreement," the court was correct in going beyond
the mere words of the agreement to the substance of the arrangement
to find that carriers for the paper did not have the requisite control to
characterize them as independent contractors. As shown earlier, the
Tribune controlled virtually every aspect of the carrier's job. Hem-
merling is clear precedent for moving beyond the contract to the core
of the relationship itself. The supreme court continuously has held
that the facts of each situation determine whether an individual is an
independent contractor or employee. Under this analysis, if the court
had accepted the contract language as binding, it would have been out
of line with its past rulings.
The trial judge, as quoted by both the court of appeals and supreme
court, summarized the reading of the contract: "It is beyond sophistry
and closer to outright dishonesty to characterize a 10-year-old party to
a contract as a 'little merchant' and thus an independent contrac-
tor."' 0 0 When the relationship between Brauner and the Tribune is
analyzed carefully, it shows that the paper had extensive control over
her actions. The supreme court agreed with the trial judge that the
contract language did not control the issue of whether or not the carri-
ers were independent contractors, and contract language that charac-
99. Id. at 927, 530 N.W.2d at 921. Cf Stephens v. Celeryvale Transp., Inc., 205 Neb.
12, 12, 286 N.W.2d 420, 421 (1979). In Stephens, the court held that if a contract
exists between a claimant and employer that defines the relationship as that of
an independent contractor and nothing in the performance by the parties is in-
consistent with the relationship described in the contract, then the independent
contractor is, as a matter of law, bound by the contract and is not to be deemed an
employee. See also Knowlton v. Airport Transp. Co., 235 Neb. 96, 99, 454 N.W.2d
278, 280 (1990)(finding that a driver leasing a van from company was an in-
dependent contractor under terms of the contract); Spulak v. Estep, 216 Neb. 523,
526-27, 344 N.W.2d 475, 477 (1984)(holding it was unnecessary to go through the
ten-factor analysis because the terms of the contract and all actions in accordance
with the contract supported the finding that the worker was an independent
contractor).
100. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 959, 540 N.W.2d 339,
351 (1995); Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 3 Neb. Ct. App. 367, 382,
526 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (1995).
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terizes the relationship as one of an independent contractor cannot
disguise the actual nature of the relationship.1 0 1
The final factor to be analyzed is whether the employer is in the
business. Although associated with this factor is whether the em-
ployer withholds income tax from the individual's paycheck, this sub-
factor was irrelevant in Larson because state and federal tax
regulations exempt the normal withholding of income from the earn-
ings of newspaper carriers younger than eighteen.' 02 Moreover, the
Tribune hardly could argue that it is not in the business of selling and
delivering newspapers.
The defendants also argued that the court's decision was inconsis-
tent with previous holdings, particularly Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit
Co.,1 0 3 Eden v. Spaulding,1 04 and Stephens v. Celeryvale Transport,
Inc.i0 5 These rulings, however, did not delve into the status of news-
paper carriers as employees. The court found the fact pattern in each
case was dissimilar to the Larson facts and therefore did not control
its decision. This finding rested upon the principle that the determi-
nation of whether a worker is an employee, as distinguished from an
independent contractor, must be made based on all the facts of the
case. The supreme court in each case analyzed the facts and con-
cluded that in each instance, the individual was better characterized
as an independent contractor rather than an employee. It should be
noted that the court in Anthony, Eden, and Stephens applied the same
tests in its analysis as it did in Larson.1 06
In applying past precedent, it is important to note that the issue of
whether a newspaper carrier is an independent contractor or em-
ployee is a question of fact, not a matter of law. The supreme court
wisely did not conclude in its analysis of Jennifer Larson's situation
that all newspaper carriers are employees as a matter of law. Instead,
the determination rests upon the facts in each case. Under the court's
analysis, a change in facts easily could result in finding that the news-
paper carrier is an independent contractor. In cases resting upon the
status of an individual as an employee or independent contractor, the
101. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 959, 540 N.W.2d 339,
351 (1995).
102. Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 3401(a)(10), 3121(b)(14) (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2753
(Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
103. 239 Neb. 404,476 N.W.2d 559 (1991)(upholding a contract between an individual
and a trucking firm that defined the relationship as that of an independent
contractor).
104. 218 Neb. 799, 359 N.W.2d 758 (1984)(holding that the ten-factor analysis showed
that an individual who had a hauling contract with an employer was an in-
dependent contractor).
105. 205 Neb. 12, 286 N.W.2d 420 (1979)(holding that an individual under contract to
a trucking firm was an independent contractor).




Nebraska Supreme Court is clear in its holdings that facts always
drive these determinations.
The trial court will not be overturned unless its findings of fact are
clearly wrong. The supreme court in Larson agreed with the trial
court in characterizing newspaper carriers of the Tribune as employ-
ees and concluded that this finding was supported by sufficient compe-
tent evidence.
C. Other Considerations of the Ten-Factor Analysis
Several additional issues are worthy of discussion concerning the
supreme court's application of the ten-factor analysis in Larson. First,
the court focused solely on cases from Nebraska. Second, the court did
not focus on Jennifer Larson's position as a newspaper carrier to guide
its decision. Finally, the supreme court and the court of appeals ig-
nored Larson's argument for the adoption of a different test in work-
ers' compensation cases. Focusing on missing aspects from the
holding in Larson may illustrate how the court will rule in future
cases.
In its application of the ten-factor analysis in Larson, the supreme
court cited only Nebraska cases.10 7 The court must have determined
that adequate holdings from previous cases guided its opinion. If the
court continues to follow this approach, attorneys would be prudent to
base arguments on appeal exclusively on Nebraska cases. Although
the ten-factor approach to independent contractor/employee determi-
nations is cumbersome at best, the court appears comfortable applying
the test based on past precedent.
Along with citing only Nebraska cases in its ten-factor analysis,
the court also ignored cases from other jurisdictions on the issue of
whether a newspaper carrier was an independent contractor or em-
ployee as a matter of law. The court of appeals in Larson did address
this issue and concluded that cases from other jurisdictions each
turned on its own set of facts.308 The supreme court did not focus on
the nature of Jennifer Larson's work, but instead focused upon facts
surrounding her relationship with the Tribune. As a result, relation-
ships between workers and employers will be defined by the specific
facts of each case and not by the type of work.
Finally, the supreme court and the court of appeals ignored Lar-
son's attorney's argumentsl 0 9 that Jennifer was an employee under
the relative nature of work test. Under this test, "the modern ten-
107. Id. at 950-59, 540 N.W.2d at 346-51.
108. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 3 Neb. Ct. App. 367, 374-75, 526
N.W.2d 691, 697-98 (1995).
109. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 32-36, Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc.,
3 Neb. Ct. App. 367, 526 N.W.2d 691 (1995)(No. A-94-183).
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dency is to find employment when the work being done is an integral
part of the regular business of the employer and when the worker,
relative to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or
professional service."1 0 Several reasons suggest that the relative na-
ture of the work test may be superior to the ten-factor control test.
These reasons concern the vagueness of the ten-factor control test and
the ability of employers to avoid the financial costs of employees by
hiring individuals as independent contractors.i" The utility of using
the relative nature of work test is apparent when compared to the ten-
factor approach. Yet, Nebraska courts have not recognized this utility
in determinations of employee/independent contractor status.
D. Substitute Employee Doctrine Established in Larson
The remaining issue to consider is Jennifer Larson's status as a
substitute employee. She had no express contract with the Tribune,
but had agreed with Valerie Brauner to deliver papers for half of
Brauner's route. The trial court defined Larson's status as a substi-
tute employee of Brauner and, because the Tribune had actual knowl-
edge of the arrangement, the court concluded that Larson was an
employee of the paper.ii
2
Larson had no express contract with the paper. Brauner had
trouble delivering the route. As a result, she and Larson shared it.
Brauner, however, maintained exclusive contact with the paper. Lar-
son notified the paper of the arrangement and wrote a letter to the
paper detailing the relationship. The district supervisor even asked
Brauner whether the arrangement of sharing the route was satisfac-
tory. The review panel held that the Tribune had knowledge only that
an independent contractor may have had someone helping to deliver
the papers. The supreme court disagreed with that conclusion."i
3
The court found that the Tribune knew of and never objected to the
arrangement and, therefore, they acquiesced to it. Section 48-115(2)
provides that every person who is engaged in a business under any
contract for hire, expressed or implied, oral or written, shall have the
same election of remedies under the Workers' Compensation Act as
other employees."i 4 The key to this provision is the idea that a con-
tract could be expressed or implied, including a contract with minors.
It is recognized that a person working as a substitute for another may
110. 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 45.00 (1993).
111. Id. § 45.10.
112. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 961-64, 540 N.W.2d
339, 352-53 (1995).
113. Id. at 963, 540 N.W.2d at 353.
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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be an employee under a workers' compensation statute, at least when
the employer knows of and acquiesces to the substitution.115
The Tribune actively encouraged its carriers to provide substitutes
when the carriers were unable to deliver the paper themselves. In
Larson, the Tribune actually acquiesced to Brauner's relationship
with Larson. It is not a great leap to hold that Larson had an implied
contract with the Tribune. The court followed the reasoning of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Bobik v. Industrial Commission: when a
master expressly or impliedly assents to an arrangement that directs
an employee to act as his substitute, the substitute occupies the posi-
tion of the employee to the master.1 16 The court also followed the New
Jersey court's ruling in Veit v. Courier Post Newspaper: when newspa-
per companies in the ordinary course of their business give the carri-
ers authority to engage substitutes, an implied contract arises
between the substitute and the employer.117
The Larson court held that an implied agreement existed between
Larson and the Tribune because the girls had split the route for six
months.1 ' 8 Thus, Larson had the same status as any other carrier
employed by the paper. The court reasoned that because Brauner was
an employee, so too was Larson. The significant point seems to be
that the court would appear to hold all newspaper carrier substitutes
as employees. If a newspaper directs its carriers to engage substi-
tutes, the substitutes in turn will become employees if the carrier is
considered to be an employee.
The court easily could have stopped before pushing this point. Be-
cause the Tribune had actual knowledge of the arrangement between
Larson and Brauner, an implied agreement easily could have been
found. Under section 48-115(2), a finding of an implied contract for
hire results in the individual assuming the rights of an employee
under Nebraska law.119 The court went on, however, to rule on the
issue of substitute employees and followed the position held in trea-
tises.120 If the court would have relied only upon a finding of implied
contract between Larson and the Tribune, the section of the opinion in
Larson discussing substitute employees would have been largely
worthless. The court, however, seized its opportunity to rule on the
issue of substitute employees and clarified the law for future cases. If
the employer authorizes the employee to use a substitute employee,
the substitute stands in the employee's shoes in regard to the em-
115. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 74 (1958).
116. 64 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 1946).
117. 382 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
118. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 963-64, 540 N.W.2d
339, 353 (1995).
119. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
120. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 74 (1958).
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ployer. Therefore the court ruled not only in this case, but also fash-
ioned a rule to apply to similar cases in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled correctly in Larson. Any other
outcome would have been inconsistent with past rulings. Larson is
the latest in a line of cases dealing with the issue of whether an indi-
vidual is an employee or independent contractor. The ruling is evolu-
tionary in nature. It clarifies statutory questions, applies an existing
test to the specific facts, and creates precedent on the issue of substi-
tute employees.
The Larson court ruled that Jennifer Larson, in her relationship
with the Fremont Tribune, was an employee as a matter of law. The
Tribune exerted too much control over its carriers to classify the paper
as an independent contractor. The court insured that it will analyze
each case involving a determination of employee/independent contrac-
tor status based on its specific set of facts. But the court stopped short
of holding that all newspaper carriers are employees as a matter of
law. Yet Larson, as a case on point, makes it easier to argue that
newspaper carriers are employees; nevertheless, that argument by no
means is conclusive. Rather, the court will look to the facts of each
case before deciding whether an individual is an employee or in-
dependent contractor.
The precedential value of Larson is that it clarifies certain areas of
workers' compensation law. The impact on Nebraska law is that since
Larson, it is now easier to determine whether a court will hold that an
individual is an employee or independent contractor. Additionally,
once the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court makes a decision,
the appellate procedure is clear. The workers' compensation court
rules on the facts, and any appeals then go to the compensation court
review panel, then to the court of appeals, and finally to the Nebraska
Supreme Court. Larson also narrows the scope of review for the com-
pensation court review panel. The review panel is limited in its re-
view, and under section 48-179, the panel cannot disturb factual
conclusions made by the workers' compensation trial court.
The supreme court also held that substitute employees working
with the approval of the employer have the same rights as regular
employees under Nebraska law. The significance of this ruling for em-
ployees and employers is readily apparent. If an employer is required
to provide workers' compensation coverage for employees, the em-
ployer likewise should be compelled to provide coverage for workers
filling the substitute employee role. It should be a logical conclusion of
law that employers are required to provide compensation coverage for
substitute employees when the employer allows the employee to
choose the substitute.
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Jennifer Larson's accident was tragic. The court correctly looked
beyond the accident and instead focused upon the facts behind Lar-
son's relationship with the Fremont Tribune in delivering its newspa-
pers. The result of the court's analysis is a holding that does not break
with past precedents, but instead becomes the leading case in this
area of Nebraska law. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc. is
the best example to date in determining whether an individual is an
employee or independent contractor.
Michael F. Polk '98
